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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Legal language must follow the laws of language (grammar) that widely known and commonly used by 
the public, including groups of the scientist. Legal language on the other hand also recognizes specific 
terminologies. These terminologies were introduced by jurists or by legislative power holders. Accordingly, 
legal language became the product of legal doctrines or political decisions. The problems arose when a number 
of compositions and legal terms turned out to be elusive, convoluted, and ambiguous due to the pattern of 
writing that was once done and because of certain considerations. This article proposed reviewing the factors 
that result in problems. The author presented a solution to observe using hermeneutic methods of law and legal 
reasoning. The author argued that the text of the law was not neutral since it was trapped not only by the laws of 
language but also by the perspective of the interpreters as they believed such a perspective was based on the 
guidance of legal science. By using legal hermeneutics can be checked the depth of the meaning of the law; 
while over the legal reasoning can be seen its rationale according to legal science.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The legal language must obey the laws of language. This is a jargon that must be accepted, 
considering that every language has its own rules. Those rules refer to the grammar, especially the 
syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects (Morris, 1970; Danet, 1980). Thus, legal language must 
follow all the rules. The law is a system of legal relations which condition social action to serve the 
common interest. The law is a product of social processes which determine society's common interest 
and which organize the making and application of law (Allott, 1999). But, a law is formally 
considered as a political product. As stated by the legal positivists, the law is a command of lawgivers. 
Aristotle compares the lawgiver to a craftsman who turns natural material (the exigencies of nature 
and natural human impulses) into a finished product (a legal order). Such persons are totally 
trustworthy and incorruptible; they do not require safeguards against the abuse of power (Swiffen, 
2011; Keith, Tate, & Poe, 2009). 
 
 Perhaps the most extreme version of this approach is not surprisingly rendered from a civil 
law perspective, but it comes from Montesquieu who said that judicial judgments are to be “fixed to 
such a degree that they are never anything but a precise text of the law”. Judges are “only the mouth 
that pronounces the words of the law, inanimate beings who can moderate neither its force nor its 
rigor” (Terrell, 2012). This perspective is taken to prevent any differences in the legal meaning. The 
law wants to have uniformity of meaning for everyone. Only in this way the law can achieve legal 
certainty (Posner, 1987). 
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 Since laws are made by political authorities, the legal language is also loaded with political 
contents and created for the sake of the people. They believe that all authorized rulers are always of 
good will to legislate and enforce the law. In fact, they are not. There are numerous occasions that 
legislation is no longer neutral. Analyses of this partiality may first be seen from the use of the 
language. Some indicators of this can be traced from the legal language as it is used in the language of 
the legislation. The indicators can be viewed in four factors that arise related to legal concepts and 
legal propositions. Such problems can be tracked by using two instruments, namely legal 
hermeneutics, and legal reasoning. These are the things that will be addressed in this paper.     
 
 
METHODS 
 
 
 This article departs from the study of some regulations randomly held. The regulations are 
analyzed by looking for examples of problematic language in it. This research can be considered as a 
text analysis. The analysis is conducted on the factors that characterize the problem of legal language 
as contained in this law. Hermeneutics and legal reasoning approach specifically are raised in this 
study to demonstrate that the problems can be resolved with a text not out of the laws of language.  
 
 To some extent, this research can be regarded as hermeneutic research. It is always about 
understanding, about what it means to be in the world in a particular way. Truth, at least the truth 
about being human and human practice, is also tricky because it is located in time and place. It can and 
does change (and stay the same) over time and between places. The hermeneutic truth is plural, not 
singular (Moules et al., 2014). In many ways, the work of hermeneutics as a research approach is 
somewhat intuitive, but we also believe it is something that can be taught, learned, and definitely 
practiced (Moules & McCaffrey, 2015). 
 
 The choice of the method is considered appropriate to examine the issue of language in legal 
texts. There are numerous studies applying hermeneutics method, and many shades of methods are 
utilized. One of them is philosophical hermeneutics. According to Mootz (2009), philosophical 
hermeneutics provides an ontological account of the social nature of understanding that girds 
rhetorical activity. Rhetorical analysis moves from this ontology to political engagement, revealing the 
entwinement of theory and practice. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
 The problems that want to be raised in this paper is about the factors that characterize the 
relationship between legal language and the laws of language, as well as the mechanism that can be 
taken to overcome the problems that arise from the relationship. The frame of thinking constructed in 
this analysis can be described in Figure 1. 
 
 The concept is a generalization of the facts. When the concept is to be communicated, then it 
needs to be given a name, i.e. terminology. Likewise, some legal concepts have something to do with 
legal terminologies. There are numerous legal terminologies that are made by the legislators. Of 
course, such terminologies are made with regards to the provisions of the laws of language. For 
example, in Article 1 point 3 of Law Number 13 The year 2003 on Manpower, found the term 
pekerja/buruh (labor) meaning every person who works for a wage or other forms of remuneration. 
The term also appears in Article 1 point (17) regarding serikat pekerja/serikat buruh (labor union). 
These two terms are clearly the same meaning. However, why should legislators use them together? 
When viewed from in the establishment of this law, it can be immediately known that it happened 
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because at that moment there was a tension between labor unions that were using different names. 
Serikat pekerja did not want to adjust the name becoming serikat buruh, and vice versa. In the end, the 
legislators tried to take the middle road by adopting both names and determining the term serikat 
pekerja/serikat buruh. This shows the inefficiency of the use of words. Another example can be shown 
when the Law Number 5 The year 1999 on Monopoly Practices and Unfair Competition uses the term 
persaingan usaha tidak sehat (unhealthy business competition) which is actually drawn from the word 
"unfair competition" in English. In the textbooks of law in Indonesia, actually, there has been more 
common to employ the term persaingan curang (unfair competition) rather than persaingan usaha 
tidak sehat (unhealthy competition) (Shidarta, 2013). Of course, the choice of these words has a 
particular reason, but sometimes it is not quite logical. 
 
LEGAL PROPOSITION
LEGAL CONCEPTS/
CONSTRUCTS
LEGAL REASONING
LEGAL
HERMENEU-
TICS
Figure: The relationship among legal propositions, legal concept/construct, legal hermeneutics, and legal reasoning
 
 
Figure 1 The Relationship among Legal Propositions,  
Legal Concept/Construct, Legal Hermeneutics, and Legal Reasoning 
 
 
 
 In some regulations, the key concepts should be defined. There are many types of definitions 
known in logics, but in general, can be divided into connotative and denotative definitions. The 
connotative definition refers to the characteristics contained in the definiendum. These characteristics 
are described in Definiens, which is subject to the rule definitio per genus proximum et differentias 
specificas. On the other hand, there is the denotative definition that formulated by direct appointment 
to the members who meet those characteristics. For example, the word "minister" in the legislation is 
not defined as a cabinet member in charge of helping the president to manage the government in a 
particular portfolio. The definition in the legislation is much more defined denotatively. For instance, 
in Article 1 point 33 of Law Number 13 The year 2003, it is said that the minister is the minister 
responsible for labor affairs. Of course, this definition does not qualify as a good connotative 
definition, but quite adequate for a legal definition. This definition is closer than the definition of a 
connotative denotative definition. According to laws of language, a definition that starts with the 
words "minister is the minister" would have violated the principles of making a satisfactory definition. 
However, if it is interpreted that the definitions in the law are not always figuratively, but also 
denotative, hence the choice of the way to eventually becomes acceptable. If we look more closely, the 
concepts in the law of most of it are not easy to find a denotation. This occurs because legislators 
actually compelled to make constructs and constructed concepts generally require connotative 
definitions. The keywords in the legislation, which in the Indonesian legal language called pranata 
hukum, generally are given with connotative definitions, while the so-called Lembaga Hukum that is 
given with denotative definitions. In the laws of language as known in Indonesian grammar, a 
constructed formulation is done by giving the suffix "ke" and the suffix "an". For example, the word 
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kemanusiaan (humanity) is the constructed result of manusia (Human). If there is a word kemanusiaan 
appearing in the keywords to be defined, the definition is done in the connotative and not denotative. 
 
 The meaning of a concept, of course, is not obliged to always rely on the definition given by 
the law. Habits in the community, court decisions, and legal doctrines can enrich the legal definitions 
set forth in Article 1 of each law. For instance, is one element of the action "theft" is "taking the 
property of others" (Article 363 of the Indonesian Penal Code). This element is not defined by law, but 
the legal doctrines and decisions of the judges and this element are defined as "moving goods from 
one place to another". This definition is generally recognized in the community of legal experts, so it 
is considered no longer need to be defined specifically in the legislation. 
 
 Legal terms cannot be changed just like the change in society. The legal terms may be sourced 
from areas regulated by such laws, for example in the fields of medicine, engineering, and agriculture, 
which each area can contribute its specific terms. Once these terms are admitted into the legislation, 
then the terms are instantly transformed into legal terms. People might agree to the terms to be their 
new terms in everyday language, but they can also reject them. If rejected, then the terms have a very 
limited use, merely used in the legal language. For example, Law Number 8 The year 2015 on Local 
Election introduces the term calon peseorangan (personal candidate), but people (also mass media) 
prefer to call it calon independen (independent candidate). 
 
 In law, concepts or constructs do not stand alone. Concepts that have given meaning in legal 
language should be linked to each other. These relationships generate propositions. In a very limited 
scope, the proposition of law is the principle of law. So, every legal principle must consist of more 
than one concept/construction law. For example, the legal principle of lex specialis is a proposition 
that connects at least two concepts, namely the concept of lex and the concept of legal generalists. This 
relationship has the capacity to explain the concept. The concept is perhaps one higher than the other 
concepts. However, it is not only this. This relationship is allowed to predict which of the two 
concepts that should be given priority in case of conflict between the two. Sometimes these 
relationships cannot be detected because the concept terminologies are not stated explicitly. It is an 
example of legality principle. This principle wears a concept name. Whereas, in the name of the 
concept of legality is already contained concepts such as lex scripta, lex certa and lex stricta (Hallevy, 
2010). Legislation that includes the principle of legality is never mentioned the existence of these 
concepts, but the doctrine introduces them. Even the word legality itself is not included in Article 1 
paragraph (1) of the Indonesian Penal Code. However, anyone who has studied law will know that in 
the article is the principle of legality. 
 
 Thus the legal language should exert its ability to be in a position to give an explanation as to 
what the relationship between the concepts that is intertwined. As well as what the meaning of which 
that can be generated. There should be clear limits to restrict the relationship concepts. Clarity was not 
dealt with only to the legislators, but above all, to the general public because they are the subject of the 
legislation. This is the place where the role of the language laws. People understand the legal language 
does not belong to the standpoint of the law but from the perspective of the laws of language. 
Legislators sometimes are not aware that the actual legal principle cannot simply be born through the 
political process. The principle of the law is born through the scientific process, in this case through 
the study of the philosophy of law and legal theory. Fauerbach who created the principle of legality is 
not a legislator. He is a legal theorist and legal philosopher who published his account of the principle 
of legality in the textbook that he wrote and later cited by many legal experts. Radbruch (1999), for 
example, when he says that the facts repeatedly have the normative force (die normative Kraft des 
Faktischen), never realizing that his words could enrich legal principles. It seems the legislators in 
Indonesia apparently are not quite aware of this situation, so that in many regulations, the legal 
principles may be created very easily. For instance, in Law Number 12 The year 2011 on the 
Establishment of Regulations, there are seven legal principles that must be considered, which are 
called as the foundation of legislation. The principles as stated in Article 5 include; (1) the clarity of 
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purpose, (2) the right institutions or officials, (3) the suitability among the forms, the hierarchy, and 
the contents of law, (4) can be carried out, (5) efficiency and effectiveness, (6) clear formulation, and 
(7) transparency. Then in Article 6 is added again that the substance should be reflected in the 
principles of (1) protection, (2) humanities, (3) nationality, (4) kinships, (5) the Indonesian hood, (6) 
unity in diversity, (7) justice, (8) equal position in law and government, (9) the legal order and legal 
certainty, and/or (10) balance, accord, and harmony. 
 
 Law Number 12 the Year 2011 is not careful enough to make a distinction between legal 
principles and requirements of the law. The provisions of Article 5 of that law are more referring to 
the requirements of legal principles. Impressed by the legislators that include various types of legal 
concepts and propositions of law which are later claimed as a principle of law. They do not create a 
mapping how these concepts relate to each other, are concepts that overlap, where propositions should 
be placed as a supra-principles, fundamental principles and secondary principles, and so on. So, 
principles such as stocked up without the arrangement. Things like this do not bring optimum benefits 
to the legislature for the principles of law that are too loose like this do not get a high application rate. 
 
 When a concept and proposition of law is contained in the legislation, the legal meaning of 
language-related concepts and propositions it being open. Legislators can only assume that they have 
locked the meaning of the concept and proposition it as tightly as possible in order to avoid ambiguity, 
vagueness, and value openness of meaning. Though the meaning of concepts and propositions 
coverage is no longer possible becomes verified by the legislators. So, it is right when hermeneutics 
legal experts say, the person who formulated the first meaning of the rule is merely the primary reader 
what he has made. People who become future readers have the freedom to redefine the concepts and 
propositions. Legal Hermeneutics is the theory used to interpret in the legal language. Therefore, the 
legal language refers to the validity of the norm. Then there is always a moral message to be built in 
every formulation of the norm. The formulation of this norm is a proposition consisting of 
interconnected legal concepts. 
 
 The semiotics of law as taught by Roland Barthes may be a bid to understand what the nature 
of the meaning behind the formulation of legal norms. Barthes demonstrates that the world we 
perceive is one not of facts, but rather of signs about facts which we encode and decode ceaselessly 
from signifying systems to signifying system (Waugh, 2006; Booryazadeh, 2014). For example, 
Article 284 Paragraph (1) of the Penal Code states threatened with a minimum of nine months when a 
man is married and committing adultery, whereas Article 27 of the Civil Code applies to him. This 
section continues with the words; a woman who has been married to commit adultery. This article 
contains a moral message that men and women who commit adultery should have been tied to 
marriage. So, adultery equally bachelors cannot be categorized as perpetrators of the act of adultery. 
The definition of such fornication and adultery is clearly contrary to the notion of the public. People 
understand adultery as an act of intercourse by couples who are not bound together by marriage. No 
matter what their status are already married to someone or not. Legal language will impose the 
meaning that adultery should be within the limits of such. Society may give a different meaning is far 
more extensive, but these limits will be guarded by law until a new decision is to amend it. Through 
hermeneutics, the structure of the rules can be defined more comprehensively. There is not any 
assurance that hermeneutic can bring an objective meaning, but minimal inter-subjective meaning. 
Hermeneutics can build structures that depart from the norm concepts, constructs, and propositions 
follow exactly what it is said in the text. This interpretation is generally called grammatical 
interpretation. Interestingly, this interpretation has not been completed according to hermeneutics. 
This interpretation should be reached the level of critical reflection, i.e., up to values. It is a 
philosophical interpretation. To that end, semiotics method will be very useful, so that the dimensions 
of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic. 
 
 If a structure of rules is already done through the instrument of hermeneutics, the structure of 
this requires a context as a tool for testing. This context is supplied by a concrete case. Here we see 
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that every text of the law is not going to be active (in flux) if there are no concrete cases that occur. 
Concrete case is an activator for the law. Up here is impressed that the legislation always comes first 
before the concrete case. The principle of legality also wants the law applicable prospective, not 
retroactive. However, the text of legal norms is not made in a vacuum condition. This text is inspired 
by a lot of contexts that precede the formation of positive law. If a concrete event occurs after the 
enactment of positive law, then that event has the opportunity to be associated with the positive law. 
Legal Dogmatics teaches us how to link them with legal reasoning in which syllogism is one its main 
methods to practice. The syllogism is a very classical way in legal reasoning, but it still works. 
 
 Syllogism starts from the major premise. The premise is available from the structure of the 
rules that have been interpreted correctly. At the very least, the assumption is stated thus. This 
structure can be applied to the minor premise. The second premise is obtained from a concrete case. 
The conclusion that is coming from the two premises is its synthesis. For example, if the provision 
says, "Every person who takes the goods, partly or wholly owned by another person, with intent to 
held unlawfully, will be threatened for theft, with a maximum imprisonment of five years or with at 
most sixty rupiahs" (Article 362 of the Penal Code). This article will wait until there are people who 
meet the criteria of taking goods partly or wholly owned by someone else, and so on. In a syllogism, 
every element from the norm in Article 362 is examined one by one. The word "everyone" will be 
associated with the subject of the law, regardless whoever that person(s). The word "takes the goods" 
will be linked with the action moving a thing (i.e. wallet, books, television, or any object of law). How 
to connect this could have been easy, but it can also not be very easy. It will not be easy if the textual 
(grammatical) meaning of the text will be too narrow or too broad in scope after it is connected to the 
context of the concrete event. Here again, hermeneutics becomes important to request assistance. If it 
is known that there is scope within the meaning of the text is too constricted, then the interpreter's task 
to expand the meaning of it. This expansion helps legal language that could be contextually applicable 
to answer the question of a legal event. Formerly person of goods must be tangible objects, which can 
be presented as evidence in court. When there is a theft of electricity, then the question is whether the 
electricity is also stuff? Through syllogism judge eventually turns off that items could also be 
expanded to include energy. Every energy is the goods. Electricity is energy. So, electricity is the 
goods. 
 
 Thus, the syllogism is another very useful instrument to test the validity of legal language. 
Syllogism does not come here from distant places. It comes from the laws of language. Thus it is true 
that legal language should not be out of the realm of laws of language. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 Legal language is distinctive because it is built through political decisions. It can be traced 
from the choice of words that used to be legal terminologies. Concepts and propositions of law are 
woven as a single entity in the legislation to be applied to the community. Thus, the concepts and 
propositions of law must be understood according to the laws of language.  
 
     Concepts and constructs are the modalities in the formation of the legal proposition. Every 
proposition must consist of more than one concept or construct. The problem has existed for the first 
time when a concept or construct will be named as a legal terminology. Non-legal factors, especially 
political one, have a very strong influence in choosing such a legal term. The next major issue occurs 
when a concept or construct that will be defined. The inability of legislators to produce a precise 
definition will affect the meaning presented in legal texts. There is a way which offers opportunities to 
save the meaning of misinterpretation. This method is introduced by legal hermeneutics, which can be 
seen as digging the deepest meaning. The next way is the legal reasoning, which is mainly done by 
connecting the text that has been given meaning hermeneutically, by the context. This engagement 
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process is largely done by the method of syllogism. In other words, the laws of language always 
provide instruments to assess whether the legal language has been able to function well to give a 
relatively precise meaning in settling a certain legal context. The legal language would be unable to 
escape from the laws of language. 
 
 The author believes that the study of a number of regulations in this paper shows that there are 
still a lot of fundamental weaknesses in the use of legal language in Indonesian legislation. This 
weakness must be addressed, among others, by mastering the appropriate methods of legal reasoning, 
in which the substance of legal hermeneutics is included. Further research is necessary to provide 
certain legal instruments needed to improve the legal reasoning quality of Indonesian legal apparatus 
as shown in the legal documents, such as in regulations and court decisions. 
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